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Jacob Pierre

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique / French National Centre for Scientific Research, UMR 8129, Faculty Member

Analytic Philosophy +1

78 Followers 17 FollowingTotal Views1 Public Mention

Papers

The scope and limits of enactive approaches to visual experience

Perception, 2008

I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on beha... more I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf of the so-called ‘enactive’ approach to visual experience. Secondly, I explain why the enactive view of visual experience is hard to square with the evidence in favour of the two-visual-systems model of human vision. Finally, I explore one possible way to develop the ‘pre-emptive perception’ framework and explain why, contrary to first appearances, some of the fundamental discoveries of brain mechanisms, whose function might be to underlie pre-emptive perception, do not really support the enactive approach to visual experience.

A non-mentalistic cause-based heuristic in human social evaluations

Cognition, 2013

VI. First-Person and Third-Person Mindreading

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS AN EMPIRICAL, INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE, 2005

Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of others' psychological states, not theory-of-mind judgments

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010

We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states t... more We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.

Developmental Psychology: A Precursor of Moral Judgment in Human Infants?

Current Biology, 2008

On Doing Things Intentionally

Mind & Language, 2012

The motor theory of social cognition: A critique. Trends

Making sense of early false-belief understanding

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2014

Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human

What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Pierre Jacob To cite this version: P... more

The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005

What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition?

Mind & Language, 2008

The tuning-fork model of human social cognition: A critique

Consciousness and Cognition, 2009

A Philosopher’s Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons

Topics in Cognitive Science, 2009

The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: a Critique

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2011

Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy

Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 2012

Sharing and Ascribing Goals

Mind & Language, 2012

Simulation Imagination

Concept possession a b s t r a c t The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the ... more Concept possession a b s t r a c t The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent’s intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to rep-resent others ’ emotions. After questioning all four assumptions, I point out that MNs in an observer’s brain could not synchronically resonate with MNs in an agent’s brain unless they discharged in a single brain in two distinct tasks at different times. Finally, I sketch a conceptualist alternative to the resonance model according to which a brain mechanism active in both the execution and the perception of e.g., the act of...

A Philosopher’s Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neuron

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific ... more HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific research documents, whether they are pub-lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et a ̀ la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Millikan’s Teleosemantics and Communicative Agency

The scope and limits of enactive approaches to visual experience

Perception, 2008

I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on beha... more

The scope and limits of enactive approaches to visual experience

Perception, 2008

I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on beha... more I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf of the so-called ‘enactive’ approach to visual experience. Secondly, I explain why the enactive view of visual experience is hard to square with the evidence in favour of the two-visual-systems model of human vision. Finally, I explore one possible way to develop the ‘pre-emptive perception’ framework and explain why, contrary to first appearances, some of the fundamental discoveries of brain mechanisms, whose function might be to underlie pre-emptive perception, do not really support the enactive approach to visual experience.

A non-mentalistic cause-based heuristic in human social evaluations

Cognition, 2013

VI. First-Person and Third-Person Mindreading

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS AN EMPIRICAL, INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE, 2005

Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of others' psychological states, not theory-of-mind judgments

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010

We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states t... more We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.

Developmental Psychology: A Precursor of Moral Judgment in Human Infants?

Current Biology, 2008

On Doing Things Intentionally

Mind & Language, 2012

The motor theory of social cognition: A critique. Trends

Making sense of early false-belief understanding

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2014

Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human

What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Pierre Jacob To cite this version: P... more

The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005

What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition?

Mind & Language, 2008

The tuning-fork model of human social cognition: A critique

Consciousness and Cognition, 2009

A Philosopher’s Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons

Topics in Cognitive Science, 2009

The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: a Critique

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2011

Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy

Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 2012

Sharing and Ascribing Goals

Mind & Language, 2012

Simulation Imagination

Concept possession a b s t r a c t The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the ... more Concept possession a b s t r a c t The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent’s intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to rep-resent others ’ emotions. After questioning all four assumptions, I point out that MNs in an observer’s brain could not synchronically resonate with MNs in an agent’s brain unless they discharged in a single brain in two distinct tasks at different times. Finally, I sketch a conceptualist alternative to the resonance model according to which a brain mechanism active in both the execution and the perception of e.g., the act of...

A Philosopher’s Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neuron

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific ... more HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific research documents, whether they are pub-lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et a ̀ la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Millikan’s Teleosemantics and Communicative Agency

The scope and limits of enactive approaches to visual experience

Perception, 2008

I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on beha... more